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Abstract
We study how the predictive power of level-k models changes as we perturb the classical
beauty contest setting along two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the
information symmetry. We use the Morris and Shin (2002) model as the uni¯ed framework
for our study, and ¯nd that the predictive power of level-k models varies considerably along
these two dimensions. Level-k models are successful in predicting subject behavior in settings
with symmetric information and a strong coordination motive. When we introduce private
information or weaken the strength of the coordination motive, the predictive power of level-k
models decreases signi¯cantly.
1 Introduction
The experimental literature on beauty contests and related guessing games has documented sub-
stantial evidence that individuals tend to have a limited degree of strategic sophistication, especially
in settings where the strategic reasoning is not straightforward. This is best illustrated by the \p-
beauty contest" in which participants choose a number between 0 and 100 and whoever picks the
number closest to a multiple p of the group average wins a prize. When p is less than one the game
can be solved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and the unique equilibrium
is where every player chooses 0. In order to reach this equilibrium subjects need to go through
a large number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. The experimental literature on
beauty contests, however, shows that subjects usually perform one to three rounds of elimination
and that their behavior is consistently di®erent from the equilibrium prediction.
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1The theory of level-k reasoning, ¯rst proposed by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995)
with further extensions by Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta
(2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), can be used to rationalize subject behavior in the
p-beauty contest. The level-k model is based on the presumption that subjects' behavior can
be classi¯ed into di®erent levels of reasoning. The zero level of reasoning, L0, corresponds to
non-strategic behavior when strategies are selected at random without forming any beliefs about
opponents' behavior. In the literature L0 is typically considered to be a person's model of others
rather than an actual person. Level-1 players, L1, believe that all their opponents are L0 and play
a best response to this belief. Level-2 players, L2, play the best response to the belief that all their
opponents are L1 and so on. For example, when p is equal to 2=3 in the beauty contest, level-1
players choose 33 and level-2 players choose 22. As was shown in Nagel (1995) and many other
papers, there is indeed a salient pattern of levels of reasoning in the beauty contest setting.
While level-k thinking is not particularly unique to the beauty contest (see e.g. Costa-Gomes
and Crawford, 2006), the structure of the game and its simplicity are very conducive to this type of
behavior. Success in the beauty contest entirely depends on a person's ability to correctly predict
the average choice made by others. This explicitly forces individuals to think about decisions of
other players. Moreover, the symmetry of information makes this task relatively simple, which can
further encourage participants to focus on the behavior of others.
In many real applications, however, market participants often have access to both public and
private information on the underlying fundamentals, and choose actions that are not only responsive
to peer action choices but also appropriate to the fundamentals. A natural question then arises:
how will level-k models perform beyond the classical beauty contest setting?
To answer this question, we introduce a framework which generalizes the classical beauty contest
setting along two dimensions. First, it allows players to have private information that is relevant
for their action choice. Second, it allows the importance of coordination to change so that the
ability of correctly guessing other players' actions may have a di®erent impact on players' payo®s.
We then analyze how the predictive power of the level-k models varies along these two dimensions.
The generalized framework that we use for our study is a modi¯cation of the Morris and Shin
(2002) model (hereafter MS) on the social value of public information. In our setting, just as
in Morris and Shin, the agents' payo® is determined by two criteria: how well an agent's action
matches an unknown state of the world and how well his action matches the average actions of other
agents. The relative importance of both factors can be varied within the model. In particular, as the
latter becomes more important it makes the coordination motive of the game stronger. Agents in
our model receive two signals about the (unknown) underlying state. If both signals are public the
information is symmetric. If one signal is public and the other is private (as in the original Morris
and Shin setting) then the information is asymmetric and, in particular, di®erent participants have
di®erent information.
Based on this framework we design several experimental treatments that di®er from each other
in the symmetry of information and in how important it is to predict the average action of other
players. Our main ¯ndings are as follows. First, in aggregate we ¯nd that subjects place less
2weight on the public signal than the MS model predicts. We show that this is consistent with the
theoretical prediction of level-k models. An important implication is that, if agents have limited
cognitive ability, the detrimental e®ect of increased public disclosure on social welfare may not be
as strong as the MS model predicts.
Next, we compare individual subjects' behavior with level-k predictions and show that treat-
ments with public information and a strong coordination motive are the only treatments where the
percentage of individuals playing according to level-k models is high. Furthermore, in treatments
with public signals and a strong coordination motive, subjects who followed a particular level of
reasoning in the beginning would either continue to follow the same level or move to a higher one.
We interpret such a consistent pattern as evidence that subjects actually did play according to the
level-k logic rather than choosing level-k actions by coincidence. In treatments with private infor-
mation very few subjects would play according to level-k predictions, even when the coordination
motive was strong. Moreover, those who followed level-k reasoning in early periods often stopped
following any level of reasoning or regressed in their level-k thinking in later periods.
Finally, we perform maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of two level-k models: the standard
level-k model and the cognitive hierarchy (CH) model introduced in Camerer, Ho, and Chong
(2004). We ¯nd that both level-k models perform better as the coordination motive gets stronger.
In particular, in treatments with public information and a stronger coordination motive, the log-
likelihood is higher and the estimated shares of strategic types (i.e. the types that are not level-0)
are higher and more signi¯cant. With few exceptions both level-k models predict subject behavior
better than Nash equilibrium (NE), especially in treatments with public information. The perfor-
mance of the standard level-k model and the CH model is comparable, although the CH model has
fewer parameters (e.g. in treatments with public information it has only one parameter) and ¯ts
the data better than the standard level-k model in terms of log-likelihood.1
Overall, our analysis highlights the strengths and limitations of level-k models. The Morris and
Shin framework used in our study is considerably more complicated than those typically used in
level-k literature. Despite this complexity level-k models are very successful in predicting subjects'
behavior in settings that are close to the classical beauty contest. That is, when the coordination
motive is strong and information is symmetric. At the same time we ¯nd that the predictive power
of level-k models diminishes quickly as we move away from the classical setting and either weaken
the coordination motive or introduce private information.
Our experimental ¯ndings also have important policy implications. The key insight in the
analysis of Morris and Shin (2002) is that in equilibrium players often place too much weight
on the public signal relative to the weight that would be used by the social planner. Therefore,
individual information aggregation is not socially e±cient and enhanced public disclosure could hurt
social welfare. However, our theoretical analysis of level-k reasoning shows that limited cognitive
ability, either due to limited level of reasoning or incapability of Bayesian updating, necessarily
leads to subjects underweighting the public signal compared to the equilibrium prediction. We
1Gneezy (2005) applies the framework of cognitive hierarchy to analyze ¯rst-price and second-price common value
auctions with complete information, and ¯nds evidence supporting the CH theory.
3¯nd in our experiment that subjects indeed put less weight on the public signal than the theory
predicts. This ¯nding is also documented independently in a recent experimental study by Cornand
and Heinemann (2009). This implies limited cognitive ability can limit the detrimental e®ect of
increased public disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss relevant literature on
level-k thinking and the MS model. In Section 3 we provide a theoretical background for our study.
In Section 3.1 we develop the theoretical framework for our experiments which is largely based
on the MS model. In Section 3.2 we derive the prediction of level-k models in this setting and
show that subjects with limited cognitive ability will put less weight on the public signal than the
equilibrium predicts. Section 4 provides details of our experimental design and various treatments.
Our experimental results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 then concludes and the experimental
instructions are given in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
Our experimental study contributes to the existing literature on the classical beauty contest begin-
ning with Nagel (1995), who ¯rst documents the clear pattern of level-k thinking in subject behavior.
Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002); Costa-
Gomes and Crawford (2006); and Crawford and Iriberri (2007a,b), among others, have further
developed and applied level-k models to beauty contests and related settings. However, most of the
existing literature focuses on games with complete information. Notable exceptions are Crawford
and Iriberri (2007a), who applied level-k reasoning to ¯rst- and second-price auctions, and a recent
independent work by Cornand and Heinemann (2009), which is closely related to our paper.
Cornand and Heinemann (2009) conduct experiments within the framework of the MS model
and ¯nd that subjects put less weight on the public signal than the theory predicts. By assuming
that all subjects use a common level of reasoning, they ¯nd that subject behavior is consistent with
the second level of reasoning (L2). They further argue that, if all subjects behave according to L2,
the welfare result in Morris and Shin does not hold: increasing the precision of public information
is always bene¯cial. Their paper and ours share the same theoretical framework and both ¯nd
that the increased disclosure of public information is less detrimental than the theory predicts.
But there are important di®erences. They exclusively focus on the welfare implications of public
disclosure, whereas our main focus is to test the performance of level-k models across settings with
di®erent information and payo® structures. Moreover, we assume that the population consists of
a mixture of di®erent levels, whereas for the purposes of Cornand and Heinemann it was su±cient
to assume a common level.
The framework underlying our experimental study is ¯rst developed by Morris and Shin (2002)
to evaluate the value of public information on social welfare in a coordination environment. Sub-
sequently, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) generalize their analysis of the social value of information
by allowing both strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability among agents' actions.
The Morris and Shin framework has been applied to many di®erent settings including asset pric-
4ing (Allen, Morris and Shin, 2006, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2005), venture capital (Angeletos,
Lorenzoni and Pavan, 2007) and political science (Dewan and Myatt, 2007, 2008).
3 Theoretical Background
This section provides a theoretical background for our study. First, based on the MS model we
develop the framework that will be used in our experimental design. Then within this framework
we derive level-k predictions.
3.1 Modi¯ed Morris-Shin Model
There are n ex-ante identical agents, i = 1;:::;n. Agent i chooses an action ai 2 R. The payo®
function for agent i is given by
ui (ai;a¡i;µ) = C ¡ (1 ¡ r)(ai ¡ µ)
2 ¡ r(ai ¡ ¸a¡i)
2 ; (1)
where C is a constant, µ represents the underlying state, r and ¸ are constants between 0 and 1;




The payo® function has three terms. The ¯rst one is a constant C and is the highest payo® the
individual can possibly receive. The second term re°ects the loss from mismatching the underlying
state µ and is simply the square of the distance between µ and ai. The third term is the \beauty
contest" term. It measures the loss from mismatching the average action of opponents a¡i multiplied
by ¸. The parameter r measures the relative importance of coordinating with opponents' actions
versus matching the underlying state. When ¸ = 1 and C = 0 the game becomes the coordination
game speci¯ed in MS. When r = 1 and ¸ < 1 the game becomes similar to the beauty contest in
the sense that subjects only need to match ¸ times the average of other players' actions. Unlike
the beauty contest, however, everyone, not just the player whose guess is the closest to the target,
receives a non-negative payo®.
As in MS, before taking actions, agent i will receive two signals about µ. The ¯rst signal y with
precision ® is always public and given by
y = µ + ´; ´ » N (0;1=®):
We allow the second signal xi with precision ¯ to be either public or private. If it is private, then
xi = µ + "i;"i » N (0;1=¯);
and ´ and "i are independent. If it is public, then it is the same across agents and is given by
xi = µ + "; " » N (0;1=¯):
Again ´ and " are independent. After receiving xi and y; agent i chooses action ai.
5In what follows we will be speci¯cally interested in a special case of this framework when ® = ¯.
When signal xi is private, we can follow the procedure in MS to show that the unique equilibrium





1 + r ¡ ¸r
2 ¡ ¸r
y (2)





1 + r ¡ 2¸r
2 ¡ ¸r
y (3)
Our model di®ers from MS in three ways. First, we consider a setting with a ¯nite number of
players while in MS there is a continuum of players. Second, we introduce the term ¸ inside the
payo® function to match the classical p-beauty contest. Third, the payo® function in MS is always
negative, which is di±cult to implement in the laboratory. By adding a positive constant C to the
original payo® function we allow participants' payo®s to be positive without altering equilibrium
predictions.
3.2 Calculating Levels of Reasoning
Within the setting introduced in the previous section we derive actions that correspond to dif-
ferent levels of reasoning. Given that the formulas for level-k actions quickly become large and
cumbersome all the calculations in the text are presented for the case when y = 0.
It is convenient to introduce a variable ¹ which measures the relative precision of the two signals.
Recall that ® denote the precision of the public signal and ¯ denote the precision of the private
signal. We de¯ne ¹ as ¯=(®+¯) so that when precisions are equal, as in our setting, ¹ = 1=2. Given
our de¯nition of ¹ and the fact that y = 0 player i's updated estimate of the state is Ei[µ] = ¹xi.
Player i chooses ai to maximize (1) and from the ¯rst-order condition the best response is
a¤
i = (1 ¡ r)Ei [µ] + r¸Ei [¹ a¡i]:
Except for the non-strategic L0 type, agents with di®erent levels of reasoning will form di®erent
beliefs about Ei [¹ a¡i] and will choose an action accordingly.
L0: L0 agent is non-strategic and randomly chooses a number between the two signals.2 Then
the average action of L0 players with signals (xi;0) will be Ei [µ] = 1
2xi, which is equal to ¹xi
given our notations.
L1: L1 expects that other players are L0 players. It means that L1 player believes that the average
action of other players will be equal to their own estimated state: ¹ a¡i = E¡i [µ] = ¹x¡i. In
2Type L0 is often viewed as the starting point of player's analysis of others' actions rather than the type that
is actually present in the game. From this perspective it is natural to assume that type L0 randomly chooses an
action between the two signals. This is also the approach that is commonly used in the literature. An alternative
speci¯cation, related to truthful L0 in Crawford and Iriberri (2007a), is to assume that L0 completely ignores all
strategic aspects of the game and the information available to other subjects. In our setting, the average of L0 choices,
which is what determines the L1-behavior, coincides under these two approaches.
6the setting when xi is private Ei [x¡i] = Ei [µ] from which it follows that
Ei [¹ a¡i] = Ei [E¡i [µ]] = ¹(¹xi) = ¹2xi:
Therefore, L1 player in the setting with private signals will play
a
pr
L1 = (1 ¡ r)¹xi + r¸¹2xi:
When x is public Ei [x¡i] = xi and so
a
pu
L1 = (1 ¡ r)¹xi + r¸¹xi:
L2: L2 expects that other players are L1 players. In the setting with private signals L1 players
choose
a¡i = (1 ¡ r)¹x¡i + r¸¹2x¡i:
Again using Ei [x¡i] = Ei [µ], we obtain
Ei [¹ a¡i] = (1 ¡ r)¹2xi + r¸¹3xi;
so an L2 player will choose the action equal to
a
pr
L2 = (1 ¡ r)¹xi + r¸
¡
(1 ¡ r)¹2 + r¸¹3¢
xi:
By the same logic in the setting with both signals being public
a
pu
L2 = (1 ¡ r)¹xi + r¸((1 ¡ r)¹ + r¸¹)xi:





(1 ¡ r)¹ + (1 ¡ r)r¸¹2 + (1 ¡ r)r2¸2¹3 + r3¸3¹4¤
xi;





(1 ¡ r) + (1 ¡ r)r¸ + (1 ¡ r)r2¸2 + r3¸3¤
¹xi;
L1: By induction we can obtain the action choice of players with in¯nite levels of reasoning. When














In both cases it coincides with NE prediction.
7Above we derived level-k predictions under the assumption that subjects are capable of correctly
estimating signals received by others. For the setting with private signals we also consider an alter-
native level-k model where players can not perform appropriate Bayesian updating in estimating
x¡i. We call it a naive level-k model and we assume that subjects are naive in the sense that they
simply think that the other players' private signal is exactly the same as their own. Mathematically,
this is equivalent to the case when subjects receive two public signals. Notice also that in this case
if ¸ = 1 then all level-k players will play action ¹xi regardless of k. We summarize our ¯ndings in
Table 1.
private xi public xi; or private xi with naive update
L0 ¹xi ¹xi






































Table 1: Level-k actions in settings with public and private signals. Variable xi is the non-zero signal.
Proposition 1 In the setting with private signals level-k players underweight the public signals as
compared to the NE.
Proof. The weight that subjects put on the public signal is 1 minus the weight on the private
signal so it is enough to show that level-k players overweight the private signal. If aLn is the action
taken by an Ln player then aLn+1 = aLn¡[r(r¸¹)n¡(r¸¹)n+1]¹xi < aLn; where the latter follows
from the fact that ¸ and ¹ are between 0 and 1. Therefore, faLng is a decreasing sequence and
since it converges to the NE aLn > aNE for each n. This implies that the weight level-n players
put on the private signals is greater than the NE predicts. The proof for the case of naive update
is similar.
This proposition has an important implication with regards to the MS model. One of the main
results of Morris and Shin (2002) is that the coordination motive forces players to place too much
weight on the public signal relative to the weight that would be used by the social planner. As a
result, information is not aggregated e±ciently and public disclosure of more information could be
detrimental to the social welfare. However, as it follows from Proposition 1 the detrimental e®ect of
public disclosure may be less than predicted by theory if agents are not fully rational. Speci¯cally,
level-k players, whether naive or not, put higher weight on the private signal | and consequently
lower weight on the public signals | than NE predicts.
84 Experimental Design
The design of all treatments in our study is based on the modi¯ed MS framework as described
above. In this section we explain our experimental implementation of the MS framework as well as
similarities and di®erences across treatments.
4.1 Payo® Function and Signals
In all treatments the payo® function of subject i is given by
ui(ai;a¡i) = maxf2000 ¡ (1 ¡ r)(ai ¡ µ)2 ¡ r(ai ¡ ¸a¡i)2;0g; (4)
where ai is the action of subject i, µ is the true state of the world, a¡i is the average of all other
subjects' actions, ¸ 2 [0;1] is the weight put on a¡i, and r 2 [0;1] is the relative importance of
matching the weighted average of other investors' actions.
Since the payo® function given by (4) is more complicated than those in typical laboratory
experiments, every e®ort was made to ensure that subjects understood the payo® structure. First,
expression (4) was presented in a simpler way
ui(ai;a¡i) = 2000 ¡ (1 ¡ r)(ai ¡ µ)2 ¡ r(ai ¡ ¸a¡i)2: (5)
The fact that payo®s could not be negative was explained verbally in the instructions. Second, we
took advantage of the fact that each term had a very simple and intuitive interpretation. We started
by verbally explaining that there are three factors that will determine the payo®: mismatching the
underlying state, mismatching ¸a¡i, and their relative importance r. After this was understood,
we presented the actual mathematical form, explained the meaning of each term, and went through
several numerical examples. Finally, during the actual experiment at the end of each period the
second and third terms in (5) were calculated and displayed together with ai, µ, and ¸a¡i. This
proved to be very helpful for participants since it highlighted how each term in (5) a®ects the
payo®.
Notice that we bound the period pro¯t away from 0. Otherwise, subjects may incur a large loss
in a single period of the experiment that would be impossible to recover even if subjects receive
the maximum of 2000 each period afterwards.3
All treatments had a similar structure and di®ered only in two aspects: parameter values and
whether signal xi was public or private. State µ and signals, whether public or private, were
generated prior to the experiment. For each round t, state µ is generated randomly according to
a uniform distribution on [400;700]. Given µ, the signals are independently drawn from a normal
distribution N (µ;3600). Signal y is public and is the same for all subjects. Signal xi can be public
or private. In treatments when it is private di®erent subjects in a group observe di®erent signals.
3This can potentially a®ect the equilibrium prediction. When the maximum of (5) is negative the agent would be
indi®erent between all actions. One can show that this happens only when the two signals are very far apart. In our
experiment this happened exactly 4 times which is approximately 0.1% of all observations.
9When it is public all subjects observe the same signal. Signals and the state were generated in such
a way so that each period all groups of subjects received the same signals and the underlying state
was the same. If, say, members of group 1 received private signals 105, 72, 41 and 36 then in all
other groups there would be a member who received signal 105, a (di®erent) member with signal
72 and so on.
Subjects were not informed about the distributions used for state and signal generation. This
was done for two reasons. First, we did not want to overwhelm participants with mathematical
details. Second, knowing the support of µ would make the Bayesian update more complicated,
especially, when signals are outside of the support. Instead, we verbally explained how to interpret
each signal and how to use them to infer the value of the state. The precise wording is given in the
instructions in the Appendix.
After the state and signals are generated, we normalize them by subtracting y from each of them
so that triple (µ;xi;y) becomes (µ ¡ y;xi ¡ y;0) and normalized signal y, therefore, is always 0.
Both normalized signals are then displayed on the computer screens and the payo®s are calculated
using normalized state value, µ¡y. Note that normalized x-signals and the normalized state could
be negative. The reason for using the normalization is three-fold: ¯rst, it substantially simpli¯es
the environment. It is easier to make a decision with signals 0 and 43 rather than with signals 529
and 572. Second, this guarantees that subjects know that y was indeed a public signal. Third, it
makes our setting similar to the standard beauty contest setting.
4.2 Treatment and Session Description
Four treatments were designed for this study. In the ¯rst treatment signal xi was private and ¸ = 1.
We label this treatment Pr-A as the non-zero signal was private and the participants must match
the average action of other investors. In the second treatment we set ¸ = 1=2 so that subjects
need to match µ and one-half of the average action of their opponents. The latter consideration
makes the game related to the p-beauty contest with p = 1=2. In this treatment each participant
still receives a private signal. We label the treatment Pr-H where the H represents that individuals
must now match one-half of the average action. In our third treatment ¸ = 1=2 as in Pr-H but both
signals are public. As such only two signals are drawn every period, and it is common knowledge
that both signals are public. We label this treatment Pu-H as the non-zero signal is now a public
signal and subjects need to match one-half of the average action. Our ¯nal treatment is identical
to the Pu-H treatment except that participants are required to choose an action between the two
signals. This treatment is labeled PuR-H as it is identical to Pu-H except that the domain of
actions is restricted.
Among the treatments we conduct PuR-H is the closest to the beauty contest setting. First,
subjects' choices are restricted to [0;xt] which makes the game dominance solvable.4 Second, all
4To see this, recall that the best response is given by ai = (1 ¡ r)xi + r¸a¡i. Without loss of generality we can
assume xi > 0. Because subjects are restricted to choose actions between [0;xi], we can ¯rst eliminate actions outside
of the interval [(1 ¡ r)xi=2;(1 ¡ r)xi=2 + r¸xi]. Once we do that, we can further eliminate actions outside of the
interval





and so on. By repeating this procedure we will get a
10information is common knowledge and, ¯nally, when r gets closer to 1 the subjects' goal becomes
to match 1
2a¡i. One notable di®erence from the BC model is that here all subjects, not just the
player who is closest to one-half of the average, are paid. However, the tournament aspect of the
BC is still retained in that subjects with actions closer to ¸a¡i in PuR-H receive higher payo®s
than those farther away. Table 2 provides a summary of the treatments, their mnemonic names,
and the number of subjects in each treatment.
Treatment y xi ¸ Restricted Domain? # of subjects
Pr-A 0 private 1 No 19
Pr-H 0 private 1
2 No 13
Pu-H 0 public 1
2 No 17
PuR-H 0 public 1
2 Yes 11
Table 2: Description of experimental sessions.
Sessions are based on one of the four treatments described above, and each consists of 6 phases
with 10 rounds in each phase, for a total of 60 rounds. Within each phase the value of r is ¯xed
but r is di®erent across phases. We use six values of r: 0:15, 0:3, 0:5, 0:65, 0:8 and 0:95: For each
session we use the following order of r across phases: 0:15, 0:5, 0:8, 0:95, 0:3, and ¯nally 0:65.
Thus, in the ¯rst phase (¯rst 10 rounds) subjects make decisions with r = 0:15, while in the second
phase (rounds 11-20) subjects make decisions with r = 0:5 and so on. Note that we start with a
low value of r, gradually increase r until phase four, decrease r between the fourth and ¯fth phases,
and then increase it again. The choice of a non-monotone sequence of r's can help us separate the
e®ect of r from the e®ect of learning. For example, if subjects' behavior is similar in phases with
r = 0:15 (the ¯rst 10 rounds) and r = 0:3 (the ¯fth ten rounds) then it suggests that this behavior
is caused by low r and not by lack of subject's experience with the environment.
Overall, our design enables us to vary the standard beauty contest setting in the following
two directions. First, by changing r we vary the strength of the coordination motive. This is
interesting because games in which the importance of coordination varies can capture a wide range
of economic applications such as monetary policy (Morris and Shin, 2002), asset pricing (Allen,
Morris and Shin, 2003, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2005), venture capital (Angeletos, Lorenzoni and
Pavan, 2007) and political campaigns (Dewan and Myatt, 2007, 2008). While levels of reasoning
are well-de¯ned for any value of r, one would expect that subjects will focus less on the actions of
others as the coordination motive becomes weaker. If this is correct it would suggest that in games
where coordination is less important or its e®ect is less obvious subjects will be less likely to follow
level-k reasoning.
Second, we introduce private information into the game by making the second signal xi private.
Private information is prevalent in many economic applications and therefore it is important to
understand how well level-k models can explain the data in settings with private information.
Indeed, level-k reasonings have been applied to classical settings with private information, such
sequence of intervals with length r
k¸
kxi, and this sequence will shrink to a point, which is NE.
11as the winner's curse in common value auctions and overbidding in private value auctions (see
Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a). However, the comparison of level-k model performance between
the complete and private information settings, both in absolute and relative terms, has not been
studied yet.
4.3 Procedures
Sessions were conducted at UNC Charlotte between March 2008-March 2009. Subjects were
typically undergraduate students, primarily recruited from the business school but not exclusively.
Subjects were seated at visually isolated carrels and were forbidden to communicate with other
subjects throughout the duration of the experiment. Instructions were read aloud to subjects,
and a few minutes was spent discussing how di®erent values of r could impact the subjects' loss
from mismatching the state µ (i.e. the term ¡(1 ¡ r)(ai ¡ µ)2) and the loss from mismatching the
decisions of other investors (i.e. the term ¡r(ai¡¸a¡i)2). To reinforce this distinction in the actual
experiment after each round a payo® screen displayed the loss from mismatching each of these two
terms as well as the total payo®.
All subjects were divided into four-person groups which were re-assigned in the beginning of
each period. In some sessions we had a number of subjects that was not divisible by 4. In those
instances we used the following procedure. First, the computer would form as many groups as
possible. The remaining subjects would form an incomplete group that was completed by the
decisions of a subject(s) from fully completed groups. When relevant the subject(s) chosen from
the fully formed group was the one who observed the private signal di®erent from those observed
by members of incomplete group. For instance, if the private signals in a fully completed Pr-H were
105, 72, 41, and 36, and the private signals of an incomplete group were 105, 72, and 41, then a
decision from a subject who saw a private signal of 36 would be used to complete the incomplete
group. Even though the decision of this randomly chosen subject is used for two groups, that
subject will only receive the payo® based on the outcome within her fully formed group.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were shown signals and were asked to submit a decision
for ai. Depending on the treatment, subjects were informed that either both signals were public
signals or one was a public signal and the other was a private signal only observable to that speci¯c
subject. When all decisions were submitted, a¡i and pro¯t were calculated for each agent. At the
end of each round subjects were shown a screen containing their own action choice, ai, the true
state, µ, the average opponent action, a¡i and their payo® for the current round.
Subjects' cash payment is determined as follows. At the end of the experiment one of the six
phases is randomly chosen. A subject's total payo® during the chosen phase is calculated and
converted it into USD by multiplying it by .001. Thus, if a subject earned 10500 during the chosen
phase it will become 10.50$. This is in addition to the 5$ show-up fee that all subjects received.
The average payment to subjects, including the show-up fee, was 15$ for a 75-90 minute session.
125 Results
In this section we analyze subjects' behavior and study how well it matches NE and level-k (Lk)
predictions. Given that NE and Lk actions are linear combinations of a random non-zero signal
x and zero signal y, they will vary each period even when the treatment and the value of r,
that is the session phase, are ¯xed. To make results comparable across periods and treatments
we normalize the non-zero signal to be 100 and adjust subjects' actions as well as NE and Lk
predictions accordingly. For example, given action a and non-zero signal x, the normalized action
is an = 100¢a=x so that action a = x=2 is normalized to 50 and action a = x is normalized to 100.
The interpretation of normalized values is that they represent the percentage weight a particular
action or a prediction puts on a non-zero signal.
5.1 NE and Subjects' Behavior































































































































Figure 1: Subjects' behavior and NE in all four treatments. On the y-axis is the average weight that subjects put
on the zero signal. Solid line is NE; dotted line, an, is the average weight over all actions; dash-dotted line, a15n, is
the average over actions that where taken when the distance between the signals is at least 15.
First, we compare subjects' behavior with NE predictions. For each treatment and each r we
calculate the average normalized action an and plot it on Figure 1 together with the normalized NE
prediction. One caveat with normalization is that when x is close to zero it becomes too sensitive to
small changes in behavior. For example, if x = 4 then two close actions 1 and 2 will be normalized
13as 25 and 50. To address this problem we calculate and plot an additional variable a15n which is
the average of all normalized actions that were taken by subjects observing jxj ¸ 15.
As we see from Figure 1, in all four treatments subjects' actions tend to be higher than NE
predicts. In other words, subjects tend to overweight the non-zero signal which is private in Pr-A
and Pr-H and public in Pu-H and PuR-H. In a setting similar to our Pr-A treatment Cornand and
Heinemann (2009) also observed the overweighing of private signals by subjects.
r 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 41.21 31.77 40.02 27.05 32.66 39.13
Pr-H 49.12 35.74 45.12 21.68 38.00 34.02
Pu-H 23.03 22.68 25.91 9.45 14.99 12.86
PuR-H 21.54 14.54 20.80 8.96 17.14 17.02
Table 3: Average absolute deviation of observed behavior from NE across di®erent treatments and phases. The
deviation is calculated based on normalized data with non-zero signal normalized to 100. Higher r means stronger
coordination motive.
Another interesting observations is that for intermediate values of r NE is matched very closely.
It happens in all treatments when r = 0:65 and in treatments with private signals when r = 0:5.
To test whether this was a result of aggregation or if subjects did play NE in those phases we
calculated the average absolute deviation of each action from NE (in normalized units). The results
are displayed in Table 3.5 It can be immediately seen that in each treatment the phase r = 0:5
had the second-largest or largest average deviation from NE. In contrast, the r = 0:65 phase has
consistently the best performance as compared with other phases within the same treatment. Given
that r = 0:65 was the last phase this might indicate that with experience subjects begin to play
closer to the NE prediction.
Result 1: In aggregate, subjects put a higher weight on the non-zero signal than NE predicts.
Overall, NE performs the best in the last phase of the study with r = 0:65.
5.2 Level-k Models and Subjects' Behavior
As we showed in Section 3 level-k players will overweight non-zero signal regardless of k. Therefore,
in aggregate subjects behavior is consistent with level-k predictions. In this section we study how
well level-k reasoning performs on individual level.
A few things need to be taken into account. First, level-k behavior is often considered as a way
to describe subjects' initial responses in which case it should be more pronounced in the beginning
of the phase. Second, subjects' behavior can change as the experiment proceeds. They can switch
from one level to another one, presumably a more sophisticated one, or they could experiment in
the beginning of the phase and then converge to a particular level. Finally, even those subjects
5As before we calculated the average absolute deviations for the entire sample and the average deviations excluding
observations with jxj < 15, but only the latter is reported in the paper. Results are qualitatively similar. The only
major di®erence is an outlier in treatment Pr-H with r = 0:3, where the average deviation for the entire sample was
125.22. The presence of the outlier can be also seen on Figure 1.
14who did go through some levels of reasoning are likely to be biased towards integers, particularly
those ending with 0 and 5. All this suggests that a simple search for subjects whose actions are
equal to Lk predictions every period is likely to overlook many instances of level-k behavior.
r 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 5.26 2.63 13.16 21.05 7.89 21.05
Pr-H 7.69 0.00 11.54 34.62 11.54 19.23
Pu-H 5.88 17.65 17.65 52.94 64.71 91.18
PuR-H 4.55 36.36 18.18 63.64 63.64 86.36
Table 4: Percentage of subjects who closely followed one of the levels of reasoning. We say that a subject's behavior
closely followed one of the levels of reasoning during a given half of the phase if two conditions hold. First, the average
deviation of subjects' choices from this level was the smallest when compared to other levels. Second, the average
deviation was less than 10 (in normalized units).
To address these concerns we used the following approach to elicit level-k behavior. We divided
the ten periods of each phase into two halves: the ¯rst ¯ve periods and second ¯ve periods. Within
each group of ¯ve periods for each subject we calculated average absolute deviations of subjects'
normalized actions from normalized level-k and NE predictions. We say that a subject's behavior
closely followed one of the levels of reasoning during a given half of the phase if two conditions
hold. First, the average deviation of subjects' choices from this level was the smallest as compared
to other levels. Second, the average deviation was less than 10 (in normalized units). The main
advantage of this approach over other alternatives6 is that it allows us to study separately subjects'
behavior in the beginning and in the end of each phase. In particular, it enables us to evaluate
how well level-k models capture subjects' initial responses and how subjects' behavior evolves with
time.
Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects who closely followed one of the levels of reasoning
during either half of a particular phase. Several things can be noticed. First, for any given r in
treatments with two public signals the success rate of level-k models is higher. The only exception
is r = 0:15 but in either case the success rate for r = 0:15 is extremely low in all four treatments.
Second, the highest success rate occurs in treatments with two public signals and r = 0:95 where
more than 85% of subjects followed some level of reasoning. This suggests that level-k models
perform best when there is no private information and the coordination motive is the strongest.
The third result, while in some sense being a corollary of the previous two, is worth mentioning
separately. In treatments with private signals even when r = 0:95 the success rate of level-k models
6In addition to the criterion used in calculating Table 4 we tried the following alternatives. We performed the
calculations using only the ¯rst ¯ve periods of each phase (as in Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a) as well as pooling the
data from all all ten periods of each phase. In addition to having the threshold of 10 normalized units we considered
thresholds of 5 and 15 normalized units. We also used actual values instead of normalized ones and tried thresholds of
5, 10 and 15. In all these cases, the qualitative picture does not change. Level-k models perform better in treatments
with public signals and in phases with high r. Quantitatively, numbers change as compared to Table 4 depending on
whether the criterion is more or less favorable to level-k reasoning. If it is more favorable, say because of a higher
threshold, then all frequencies are higher. If it is less favorable, say, because of a lower threshold or because we





































































































Figure 2: Individual behavior of ¯rst 10 subjects in treatment Pr-A (the ¯rst two rows) and in treatment Pr-H (the
last two rows). The value of r is 0.95. The ten phase periods are on the x-axis. Actions as well as level-k predictions
are on the y-axis. Dots are actions; the lowest (dotted) line is NE; solid line is L1n; dashed line on the top is L1;
dashed-dotted line in the middle is L2. To increase the scale of images we use absolute values so that all levels and
actions are positive.
is relatively low and, in particular, is much lower than in treatments with public signals.
To visualize the di®erence in subject behavior between treatments with private and public
signals, we take phase r = 0:95 of all four treatments and plot individual choices of the ¯rst 10
subjects together with level-k predictions. Figure 2 plots decisions of the ¯rst 10 subjects from the
two treatments with private signals and Figure 3 shows decisions of the ¯rst 10 subjects from the
two treatments with public signals.
Looking at subjects' choices in treatments with private signals we see that the majority of
subjects do not consistently follow a particular level of reasoning. For example, in treatment Pr-H
subjects 1 and 2 were typically playing higher than any level of reasoning, subjects 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
were not playing as high, however, their choices did not follow any particular level. Only subject 10





































































































Figure 3: Individual behavior of ¯rst 10 subjects in treatment Pu-H (the ¯rst two rows) and in treatment PuR-H
(the last two rows). The value of r is 0.95. The ten phase periods are on the x-axis. Actions as well as level-k
predictions are on the y-axis. Dots are actions. Lines for level-k predictions are ordered from top to bottom. The
solid line on the top is L1. The dash-dotted line below it is L2, the dashed line below it is L3 and the dashed line on
the bottom is NE. To increase the scale of images we use absolute values so that all levels and actions are positive.
In contrast, in treatments with public signals many subjects closely and consistently followed some
level. For example, in treatment Pu-H subject 2 followed L3, subjects 3, 6, 8, 9 and 10 followed L2.
In treatment PuR-H subjects 3 and 4 followed L1, subject 6 uses L2 in the beginning but switches
to L3 in the end, subjects 8 and 9 follow L2. Overall, these two ¯gures visualize what we already
observed in Table 4, i.e. in treatments with public signals the performance of level-k reasoning is
much better than in treatments with private signals.
Result 2: In treatments with private signals and in phases with low r only a few subjects
followed levels of reasoning. In treatments with public signals and high values of r level-k models
did the best with the majority of subjects following some level of reasoning.
The next question is how subjects' behavior evolves over time. First, we study how the predictive
17power of the level-k model changes within the phase. Given that level-k reasoning is usually viewed
as the way to describe subjects' initial responses we measure the performance of level-k models
separately in the beginning and in the end of each phase. In Table 5 we calculate percentages of
level-k subjects in the ¯rst ¯ve periods of each phase as well as percentages of level-k subjects in
the last ¯ve periods of each phase. The criterion for attributing subjects' behavior to a particular
level is the same as before. The average absolute deviation from this level prediction should be the
smallest compared to other levels and should not be more than 10 normalized units.
First 5 rounds Second 5 rounds
r 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 5.26 5.26 10.53 31.58 0.00 26.32 5.26 0.00 15.79 10.53 15.79 15.79
Pr-H 0.00 0.00 7.69 46.15 15.38 7.69 15.38 0.00 15.38 23.08 7.69 30.77
Pu-H 11.76 17.65 11.76 58.82 41.18 94.12 0.00 17.65 23.53 47.06 88.24 88.24
PuR-H 9.09 45.45 9.09 63.64 54.55 72.73 0.00 27.27 27.27 63.64 72.73 100.00
Table 5: Percentage of subjects who followed closely one of the levels of reasoning in the beginning of the phase
(the left table) and in the end of the phase (the right table). Frequencies are computed similarly to Table 4.
Comparing the left and right parts of Table 5 we see that there is no clear pattern with regards
to whether subjects are likely to exhibit level-k behavior in the beginning or in the end of the
phase. In 10 phases out of 24 level-k behavior was more common in the beginning, in 4 phases
frequencies were equal and in the remaining 10 phases it was more common in the end. Keeping
the information structure ¯xed does not reveal any clear pattern either. In treatments with public
information as well as in treatments with private information level-k behavior was as common in
the beginning as it was in the end.
Subject # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
r=0.8
1st half L1 L2 L1 L1 L3 L1 L1
2nd half L2 L2 L1 NE L1 L1 L2 L1 L2 L3 L1 L1 NE L1 L3
r=0.95
1st half L2 L3 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L1 L3 L1 L1 L3 L1 L3
2nd half NE L3 L2 L3 L2 L1 L2 L2 L1 NE L2 L1 L3 L1 L3
Table 6: Subjects' behavior in Pu-H treatment in phases with r = 0:8 and r = 0:95.
Next, we turn our attention to the r = 0:8 and r = 0:95 phases of the two treatments with
public signals which is where level-k behavior was the most prominent. From Table 5 we see that in
these phases level-k reasoning was more pronounced during the second half rather than during the
initial ¯ve periods. Looking at the evolution of subjects' choices over time we have the following
results. Among those subjects who followed some level of reasoning in both halves of a phase there
were 22 cases (out of 34) when subjects stayed with the same level in both halves, 11 cases when
subjects switched to a higher level, and 1 case when a subject switched to lower level (subject 7,
phase r = 0:95, treatment Pu-H). This is consistent with Nagel (1995) who also found that subjects
18tend to adhere to the same level of reasoning throughout the entire study.7 For those subjects who
followed some level in one half of a phase, only 3 subjects did so in the ¯rst half while 15 subjects
did so in the second half. In other words, it was more likely for subjects to switch to level-k
behavior rather than to abandon it. Similarly, looking at subjects' behavior between phases we see
that those subjects who followed some level in the r = 0:8 phase would typically continue doing
so, though perhaps using a di®erent level, in the next (r = 0:95) phase. Table 6 summarizes the
behavior of subjects in Pu-H treatment. For brevity sake we omit the similar table for the PuR-H
treatment.
Pr-A Pr-H
Subject # 2 6 8 12 14 17 18 24 28 29 30 32
r=0.8
1st half L2n L1
2nd half NE NE Ln L2n
r=0.95
1st half L2 L1 L1 Ln Ln L2
2nd half Ln Ln Ln L3n L1n L1n L3n
Table 7: Subjects' behavior in treatments with private signals. Only those subjects whose behavior could be
attributed to any level are shown.
In treatments with private signals, the picture is considerably less clear. Table 7 shows all
participants in treatments with private signals whose actions could be attributed to a particular
level in at least one half-phase. The di®erence between Tables 6 and 7 is immediate. First, as
we should expect given our previous results, only a few subjects followed some level of reasoning.
Second, among those who did only three subjects followed some level during the entire phase.
For the remaining subjects, their actions can often be attributed to some level in the second half
(7 instances) rather than in the ¯rst half (3 instances). Third, there is much less consistency in
the level-k behavior between phases. In particular, only 2 subjects (14 and 32) followed level-k
reasoning in both phases.
Result 3: We do not observe that subjects are more likely to follow level-k reasoning in the
beginning of the phase as compared to the end, or vice versa. However, in phases where level-k
behavior was most prominent, level-k reasoning was more common in the end.
Result 4: In treatments with public signals and high r subjects were more likely to switch to
Lk-behavior and within Lk behavior they were more likely to switch to higher levels. In treatments
7Nagel (1995) ¯nds that subjects' choices decreased over time which one may interpret as the evidence that
subjects learn to play with higher levels of reasoning. Nagel argues that this interpretation is false. The declining
pattern of choices is not because subjects learned to play with higher levels of reasoning but because subjects adjusted
downwards their beliefs about the average action given the outcome of the previous play. Our experiment is di®erent
in that every period new signal { or the support of the beauty contest game { are randomly drawn. Therefore,
subjects cannot directly use the information of the average action of the previous play to guess the average action
of the current play. This makes learning much slower and more di±cult in our setting. As a result we can observe
many subjects staying with the same level of reasoning without adjusting subjects' beliefs as in Nagel (1995).
19with private signals such a consistent pattern is either not observed or is considerably weaker.
The last question we want to address in this section is how frequently di®erent levels of reasoning
were followed by subjects. This information is given in Table 8 where we count how many times
subjects followed a particular level of reasoning during a half of the corresponding phase.
Pr-A Pr-H Pu-H and PuR-H
L1 L2 Ln NE L1(n) L2(n) L3n NE L1 L2 L3 NE
0.15 - - 2 - -(1) -(-) - 1 2 - - 1
0.30 - - 1 - -(-) -(-) - - 11 - - 3
0.50 1 - 4 - -(1) -(-) 1 1 4 2 - 4
0.65 2 - 4 2 5(-) -(-) - 4 7 6 - 19
0.80 - - 1 2 1(-) -(2) - - 18 11 3 4
0.95 2 1 5 - -(2) 1(-) 2 - 15 23 10 2
Total: 5 1 17 4 6(4) 1(2) 3 6 57 42 13 33
Total %: 2.2% 0.4% 7.5% 1.8% 3.8(2.6)% 0.6(1.3)% 1.9% 3.8% 17% 12.5% 3.9% 9.8%
Table 8: Each entry shows how many times subjects followed a given level within one half of a corresponding phase.
Data from treatments Pu-H and PuR-H are combined. In treatment Pr-H columns L1(n) and L2(n) show both
sophisticated and naive levels. Numbers for naive levels are in parenthesis. Numbers in the last row are calculated
as a percentage of all phase-halves played by all subjects within a given treatment.
Several things can be noticed upon inspecting Table 8. First, in treatments with private signals
naive levels were used more often than the \sophisticated" ones: 17 versus 6 in Pr-A and 9 versus
7 in Pr-H. Second, in the treatments with public signals as well as in the Pr-H treatment, L1,
regardless of naivety, was followed most frequently. In Pr-A we cannot separate L1n from higher
naive levels but we still observe that L1 was followed more often than L2. Third, in the r = 0:8
and r = 0:95 phases of Pu-H and PuR-H treatments higher levels of reasoning were used more
often than in phases with lower r. In particular, in the r = 0:95 phase level L2 was followed more
frequently than L1. Finally, we see the e®ect of learning. In the last phase of each treatment, the
one with r = 0:65, NE was followed most often.
Result 5: In all four treatments subjects were more likely to follow the ¯rst level of reasoning
independent of naivety. One notable exception is the r = 0:95 phase in treatments with public
signals where L2 was most common. In treatments with private signals naive levels of reasoning
were considerably more common.
5.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Level-k and CH Models
In the analysis above, we have shown that the predictive power of level-k reasoning is weaker as
we introduce asymmetric information or reduce the weight of coordination component. In this
subsection, we compare the results of maximum likelihood estimation across di®erent treatments
to further substantiate this ¯nding. We will perform the ML estimations of the following two
models: the standard level-k model where Lk type plays best response to the population that
20consists entirely of Lk ¡ 1 type, and the cognitive hierarchy model (CH) where Lk plays the best
response to the population that consists of the mixture of lower types L0;:::;Lk ¡ 1.
Pr-A (1140 obs.) 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
L1 0.013 0.008 0.040 0.138 0.061 0.038
L2 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.027
Ln 0.113 0.109 0.155 0.175 0.097 0.111
NE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.043
LL -862.412 -867.572 -864.334 -844.267 -853.605 -865.363
Pr-H (780 obs.)
L1 0.003 0.020 0.010 0.043 0.039 0.031
L2 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.070 0.012 0.030
L1n 0.054 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.011 0.112
L2n 0.048 0.004 0.000 0.035 0.003 0.000
NE 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.081 0.000 0.067
LL -593.383 -598.368 -599.411 -581.163 -584.006 -591.093
Pu-H (1020 obs.)
L1 0.020 0.076 0.048 0.096 0.265 0.226
L2 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.403
NE 0.010 0.041 0.027 0.204 0.071 0.220
LL -781.777 -774.376 -779.115 -738.627 -711.186 -645.063
PuR-H (660 obs.)
L1 0.000 0.010 0.031 0.112 0.180 0.288
L2 0.017 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.223 0.425
NE 0.017 0.125 0.060 0.320 0.021 0.079
LL -506.461 -499.027 -501.407 -468.224 -474.126 -420.138
Table 9: Results of the ML estimation of level-k models are shown. Estimates are in bold when they are signi¯cantly
di®erent from 0 at the 5% level.
Results of ML estimation of the standard level-k model are given in Table 9. In the estimation
we assume that L0 players choose their action at random and Lk players play the best response
to the Lk ¡ 1 strategy plus an error that is uniformly distributed around the best response. The
estimation is performed using normalized values and so the support of the error is set equal to 10
normalized units, or in other words to 10% of the distance between two signals. In the literature
the error is usually modeled as having a logistic distribution. We opted for the uniform distribution
because subjects are often biased towards \nice" numbers such as integer numbers or those ending
with 0 and 5 | something that we also observe in our data. The uniform distribution seems to be
a more natural way to capture the error generated by such a bias. In all treatments we directly
estimate the shares of L1, L2 and NE types.8 In addition to that, in treatments with private signals
we estimate shares of naive types. The share of type L0 is then calculated as one minus the sum
of the shares of other types.
Comparing the estimates within treatments we see that the log-likelihood roughly increases as r
8Adding type L3 does not signi¯cantly change the results. It changes estimates slightly for the phase with r = 0:95
only.
21increases from 0.15 to 0.95. In other words, the predictive power of the level-k model increases with
higher r, which is consistent with our discussion in previous sections. This feature is prominent for
treatments Pu-H and PuR-H, while less so for treatments with private signals. In the latter the
phase with r = 0:65 tends to perform better than the phase with r = 0:8 which could be due to
aforementioned learning e®ect. Another result that follows from Table 9 is that larger values of r
generate larger and, most importantly, signi¯cantly positive estimates of shares of di®erent types.
For example, in treatments with public signals the shares of both L1 and L2 are signi¯cantly
positive when r ¸ 0:8. Furthermore, when r = 0:95 types L1 and L2 are estimated to cover more
than 70% of the sample in PuR-H and more than 60% in Pu-H. Again as before this e®ect is less
pronounced for treatments with private signals, however, in Pr-A we still observe more signi¯cance
as r gets larger.
To compare the performance of the level-k model across treatments we use two criteria: log-
likelihood and the share of L0. Given that any choice that cannot be attributed to strategic levels
of reasoning is automatically labeled as L0, the size of the share of L0 is a good indicator of the
predictive power of the level-k models. In particular, one can interpret the estimate of the share of
L0 as the frequency of choices that cannot be explained by level-k models.
LL 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A -0.757 -0.761 -0.758 -0.741 -0.749 -0.759
Pr-H -0.761 -0.767 -0.768 -0.745 -0.749 -0.758
Pu-H -0.766 -0.759 -0.764 -0.724 -0.697 -0.632
PuR-H -0.767 -0.756 -0.760 -0.709 -0.718 -0.637
L0 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 0.87 0.88 0.76 0.67 0.82 0.78
Pr-H 0.89 0.98 0.93 0.77 0.94 0.76
Pu-H 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.70 0.46 0.15
PuR-H 0.97 0.87 0.88 0.57 0.58 0.21
Table 10: The top part of the table shows log-likelihood across treatments divided by the number of observations
and the bottom part shows shares of L0.
Table 10 displays both the log-likelihood and shares of L0 in di®erent treatments. To make
results comparable across di®erent treatments we normalized log-likelihoods by the number of
observations in a given treatment. Across all four treatments, the log-likelihood is highest when
r = 0:95 and the non-zero signal is public (treatments Pu-H and PuR-H). Within treatments with
private signals the highest log-likelihood is achieved in the last phase with r = 0:65. As for the share
of L0, it never goes below 75% in treatments with private signals, with the only exception being
the phase r = 0:65 in Pr-A. Although the performances across all four treatment are comparable
for low values of r, the share of L0 drops considerably in treatment Pu-H and PuR-H for high
values of r. In the phase with r = 0:95 the share of L0 is 21% in PuR-H and 15% in Pu-H. These
results provide statistical support to the earlier ¯nding that the standard level-k model performs
very well when there is no private information and the coordination motive is strong. In other cases
its performance is quite poor: it fails to explain more than three-quarters of observed choices.
22Next, we estimate the cognitive hierarchy model (CH) that was introduced in Camerer at al.
(2004). The idea behind the CH model is that higher types believe that opponents' population is a
mixture of lower types. For example, type L2 believes that some opponents are L1 and others are
L0 and plays accordingly. Camerer et al. assume that there is a correct distribution of di®erent
types given by the Poisson distribution with parameter ¿ so that Pr(Lk) = f(k) = exp(¡¿)¿k=k!.
Each type does not realize that there are players of the same or higher types but it correctly
estimates relative proportions of lower types. For example, type L2 will believe that the share of
L0 is f(0)=(f(0) + f(1)) and the share of L1 is f(1)=(f(0) + f(1)).
The estimation of treatments with public signals is straightforward. As before we assume
that each type plays the best response plus the error that is uniformly distributed around the
best response. The support of the error is 10 normalized units. In estimation we assumed that
the highest type in the population is L3. For treatments with private signals, we adjust the CH
estimation to account for naive types. First, we assume that both naive and sophisticated types
are unaware of higher types. Second, naive types are unaware of the sophisticated types. For
sophisticated types we considered two alternatives: one when sophisticated types are unaware of
naive types and another one when they are aware. We report only the former but the results for the
latter were very similar. Finally, we assume that the entire population is divided into two groups:
naive players and sophisticated players. The size of each group is an estimation parameter. Within
each group types are distributed according to Poisson distribution with parameter ¿.
Pr-A (1140 obs.) 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
¿ 0.052 0.084 0.118 0.338 0.148 0.238
Share of Naive 0.229 0.216 0.272 0.310 0.182 0.249
LL -774.983 -780.276 -751.247 -663.875 -759.356 -765.729
Pr-H (780 obs.)
¿ 0.217 0.151 0.150 0.344 0.252 0.644
Share of Naive 0.969 0.406 0.420 0.128 0.386 0.627
LL -542.811 -568.764 -570.062 -520.169 -544.556 -496.538
Pu-H (1020 obs.)
¿ 0.135 0.223 0.177 0.241 0.971 4.960
LL -742.858 -705.694 -727.776 -699.512 -534.554 -371.490
PuR-H (660 obs.)
¿ 0.105 0.213 0.205 0.583 0.899 5.268
LL -488.229 -459.415 -464.687 -426.619 -395.477 -236.843
Table 11: The ML estimation of the CH model.
Table 11 shows the results of estimation. A higher ¿ implies that there are larger fractions of
subjects who can do higher levels of reasoning. As we can see, the estimates of ¿ increase as r
increases, especially when r = 0:95. In general, estimates of ¿ are higher for treatments with public
signals and, as before, the log likelihood increases as r increases. Thus, just as the standard level-k
model, the CH model predicts subjects behavior better when r is higher and the information is
public. Another interesting observation that follows from Table 11 is that the CH model explains
23behavior much better than the standard level-k model. In particular, log-likelihood is higher for
the CH model despite the fact that the CH model has less parameters (one in Pu-H, PuR-H and
two in Pr-A and Pr-H).
Result 6: ML estimates con¯rm that level-k models perform the best when the coordination
motive is the strongest and information is public. In the remaining cases level-k models perform
poorly and put most of the weight on the non-strategic L0 type.
Result 7: In all treatments the CH model ¯ts subjects' behavior better than the standard level-k
model, despite the fact that the CH model has fewer parameters than the standard level-k model.
We conclude the section by comparing the e®ectiveness of estimated level-k models in predict-
ing the aggregated subject behavior relative to the NE prediction. In Table 12 we calculate the
di®erence (in normalized units) between observed and predicted behavior for NE and CH models
which we call prediction errors. In Table 13 we compare the performance of the three models by
calculating the ratios of their prediction errors. The left part compares prediction errors of the
standard level-k model versus NE and the right part compares CH versus NE. A number higher
than 1 means that NE outperforms the level-k alternative in predicting the average action of the
subjects, and a number lower than 1 means that the level-k alternative outperforms NE.
NE CH
0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 25.06 32.50 2.13 2.05 14.52 26.11 21.16 24.18 17.71 18.42 16.47 15.07
Pr-H 15.63 63.08 1.31 4.69 32.72 18.12 10.54 52.29 20.49 17.57 1.07 14.71
Pu-H 24.90 12.33 20.78 2.30 18.93 12.51 21.32 5.01 6.16 22.87 1.08 0.91
PuR-H 12.69 7.12 18.62 1.19 16.82 16.65 9.01 0.26 4.28 17.89 3.87 5.48
Table 12: Average deviation (in normalized units) of the observed behavior from the predicted behavior in NE and
the CH model.
We see from both tables that in treatments with public signals both level-k models considerably
outperform NE with the usual exception of the r = 0:65 phase. In treatments with private signals
level-k models perform somewhat worse. NE does considerably better in two phases (r = 0:65 and
r = 0:5) and slightly better in the r = 0:8 phase of Pr-A treatment. In phases with r ¸ 0:8 level-k
models tend to outperform NE and more so in treatments with public signals where the prediction
errors can di®er by a factor of 20. Looking at absolute numbers we also see that in treatments with
high r and public signals the average prediction error of NE was between 12.5 and 18.9 whereas
the CH prediction error was much lower and varied between 0.9 and 5.5.
Finally, we can use Table 13 to compare the relative performance of CH and standard level-k
models. In general, the two models have similar performance and depending on the phase and the
treatment either model may perform better than the other. There are few instances when the CH
model considerably | i.e. by a factor of at least 2 | outperforms the standard level-k model such
as the r = 0:8 phase of Pr-H or the r = 0:95 phase of Pu-H treatment. However, in these instances
both models predict the aggregated behavior reasonably closely which is the main reason for having
such large ratios. In both cases the prediction error of both models was less than four normalized
24Level-k/NE CH/NE
0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.95
Pr-A 0.84 0.73 8.29 9.44 1.15 0.59 0.84 0.74 8.31 8.99 1.13 0.58
Pr-H 0.65 0.81 16.07 3.54 0.09 1.11 0.67 0.83 15.65 3.75 0.03 0.81
Pu-H 0.84 0.36 0.25 8.66 0.05 0.26 0.86 0.41 0.30 9.94 0.06 0.07
PuR-H 0.69 0.07 0.20 13.22 0.35 0.20 0.71 0.04 0.23 15.02 0.23 0.33
Table 13: The left part of the table shows the ratio of average deviations of level-k and NE predictions. The right
part shows the ratio of average deviations of CH and NE predictions. Numbers greater than 1 mean that NE performs
better and numbers less than 1 mean that the level-k (CH) model performs better.
units. Overall, based on models' ability to predict subjects' aggregated behavior we cannot say that
one level-k model is unambiguously better than another. However, it still should be remembered
that the CH model has a smaller number of parameters and leads to a higher log-likelihood.
Keeping in mind the usual exception of the r = 0:65 phase we conclude with the following
result:
Result 8: In general, both level-k models predict the aggregated behavior better than NE. Their
advantage is particularly pronounced in treatments with public signals and strong coordination mo-
tives.
6 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper is to determine the setting in which level-k thinking most appropriately
describes subjects' behavior. To do that we generalize the classical beauty contest setting by using
the Morris and Shin (2002) framework that allows us to introduce private information and vary
the strength of the coordination motive. Having the experimental design based on the the MS
model generates an environment that is more complex than the one typically used in the level-k
literature. Despite this complexity we con¯rm the ¯nding in the existing beauty contest literature
that level-k models are indeed successful in predicting subject behavior when the game setting is
close to the classical beauty contest, when information is symmetric and the coordination motive
is strong. Moreover, most subjects choose their levels of reasoning consistently in the sense that
they either adhere to one particular level or switch to higher levels. However, as we move away
from the classical setting, the predictive power of the level-k models diminishes quickly. Only a
handful of subjects play according to level-k reasoning and those who do tend to use it in a rather
inconsistent manner.
We conjecture that the reason for these results is as follows. When the coordination motive
weakens, the behavior of other players becomes less important; as such, subjects are less likely to try
to predict it. This is true regardless of whether information is symmetric or not. The introduction
of private information into the model weakens level-k behavior because the task of predicting the
beliefs and actions of opponents becomes considerably more complex. For example, in the p-beauty
contest with p = 1=2, L1 logic can be summarized in the following simple phrase: people will just
pick actions randomly between 0 and 100 so the average action will be 50 and so I should play 25.
25In contrast, in the setting with private information the same L1 logic becomes more complicated
since subjects do not know the range from which others are choosing and have to estimate it. Given
the increased complexity of level-k reasoning, participants may rely on a di®erent rule of thumb in
settings with private information. Our results suggest that some subjects substituted naive level-k
thinking for standard level-k thinking in settings with private information. The identi¯cation of
the exact rule of thumb subjects used in the experiment is an important research question, and we
leave it for future research.
267 Appendix. Instructions for Treatment Pr-A
Welcome to a decision-making study!
Introduction
Thank you for participating in today's study in economic decision-making. These instructions
describe the procedures of the study, so please read them carefully. If you have any questions while
reading these instructions or at any time during the study, please raise your hand. At this time I
ask that you refrain from talking to any of the other participants.
General Description
This study consists of 60 rounds, time permitting. In each round all participants (including
you) have the role of investors. All participants are divided into groups with 4 investors in each
group. The division is random and will be re-done in the beginning of each round. You and the
3 other investors in your group can invest some amount of experimental currency in a particular
project. Your task is to decide how much you would like to invest into this project. Returns on
your investment will be determined by the amount that you invest (ayou) and by the following two
factors:
² the project's quality q;
² the average investments made by others: aaverage =
a1 + a2 + a3
3
;
Example: Assume that the other three investors in your group invested 150, 200 and 250.
The average amount invested by the others is aaverage = 200.
At the time when you make decisions you will NOT know either of these two factors. You will
not know the average amount invested by others, aaverage, because other participants are making
their decisions at the same time as you. You will not know q because you must make your investment
decision before q is revealed. Therefore, you will need to decide how much to invest based on the
information that will be made available to you.
Information. Signals.
In the beginning of each round you and all other investors in your group will receive two signals
that will provide you with information about the project's quality. Both signals are randomly drawn
given the project's quality q. Because signals are randomly drawn it is impossible to precisely predict
q given the signals. However, they will give you an idea of a range where q might be. The Table
below shows to you how signals should be interpreted.
27First, to make calculations easier for you one signal is always set equal to 0. Second, given
the two signals that you will see the best guess of q will be simply the average of the two signals.
Because of the randomness it is unlikely that q will ever be precisely equal to the average of the
two signals. The last two columns in the table give you an idea of how precise your guess is. You
see that in two cases out of three, i.e. with probability 2/3, the quality, q, will be at most 40 away
from the average and with probability 95% the quality will be at most 80 away from the average.
Signal 1 Signal 2 The best With prob. 2/3 With prob. 95%
guess of q q will be in q will be in
0 s (0+s)/2 (0+s)/2§40 (0 + s)=2 § 80
Example 1: Assume that you received two signals 0 and 100. Then the best guess of the
project quality would be (0 + 100)=2 = 50: With probability of 2/3 you can conclude that the
project quality will be between 10(= 50 ¡ 40) and 90(= 50 + 40) and with probability 95% the
project quality will be between -30 and 130. In the remaining 5% of the cases the quality will be
outside of the [¡30;130] interval.
Guessing the average
In the previous section we explained how to guess q given the information that you will receive
(the two signals). However, your pro¯t will also depend on how well you can guess one-half of the
average amount invested by other investors in your group. The decisions of other investors are
decisions made by humans and therefore there is no precise theory that will tell you where one-half
of the average will be.
Therefore, your best option would be to try to predict how much the other investors are going
to invest given their information. Here is what you know and what you don't know about the
information available to other investors in your group:
² They receive two signals, just like you do;
² You know the ¯rst signal that everyone receives. It is 0. All investors in your group will have
0 as the ¯rst signal.
² You do NOT know the second signal that they receive. The second signal is a private signal.
It means that you cannot see private signals received by other investors. It also means that
they cannot see the private signal that you receive.
² You DO know that private signals of other investors are generated in the same way as your
private signal. Most importantly that they are also centered around the project's quality q.
Use your knowledge about the information that other investors have to predict how much they
will invest. Based on that you can form your guess of the average investment.
28Your Pro¯t and Cash Payments
Your pro¯t will be calculated as follows. In the beginning of each round you will be given 2000
experimental points. From this amount we will deduct points when your action does not match
the project's quality. We will also deduct points when your action does not match the average
investments made by others. Your ¯nal pro¯t will be calculated by the following formula:
Payoff = 2000 ¡ (1 ¡ r)(ayou ¡ q)2 ¡ r(ayou ¡ aaverage)
2 :
The ¯rst term says that your investment will bring you at most 2000. The second term determines
your loss from mismatching the project's quality q. The third term determines your loss from
mismatching the average investments made by others.
It is possible that the project quality and the average investment will be two di®erent numbers.
In this case parameter r measures the relative importance of matching the investments of others
versus matching the quality. A lower r means matching the quality is more important. Relative
importance will be changed every 10 rounds.
The following two examples are used to illustrate how r impacts your payo®. While you will
submit decisions for these two examples they are for illustrative purposes and will not impact your
payment.
Example: Let r = 0:15 so that is it is more important to match the quality. Let quality, q,
be 10, and aaverage be 60. At your computer terminal, please submit an action of 30 now. If your
action, ayou, is 30 then your loss from mismatching the quality is (1 ¡ 0:15) ¢ (30 ¡ 10)2 = 340.
Your loss from mismatching the average investments is 0:15 ¢ (30 ¡ 60)2 = 135. You see that your
mismatch of the average investment is larger than the mismatch of quality, but your losses from
mismatching the quality are higher. Your total pro¯t is 2000 ¡ 340 ¡ 135 = 1525.
Example: Now assume that r = 0:8 so that is it is more important to match the investments
of others. As before assume that q = 10 and aaverage = 60. Thus everything is the same as in the
example above except for r. Again, please submit an action of 30 now. Your loss from mismatching
the quality is (1 ¡ 0:8) ¢ (30 ¡ 10)2 = 80 and your loss from mismatching the average investment is
much higher and is equal to 0:8 ¢ (30 ¡ 60)2 = 720. Your total pro¯t is 2000 ¡ 80 ¡ 720 = 1200.
The pro¯t that you made in each round will be converted into cash by the following procedure.
The study lasts for 60 rounds. In the end of the study we will openly and randomly choose a
sequence of 10 rounds: either from round 1 to round 10, or from round 11 to round 20 and so on.
Your cash earnings will be equal to the total pro¯t that you earned during these 10 rounds times
0.001. This is in addition to the $5 that you receive as a show-up fee. For example, if round 21 to 30
is chosen and you earned 10000 during these rounds your cash payo® will be: 10000¢0:001+5 = $15.
If in a particular round you make a negative pro¯t it will count as 0.
29Summary
The study consists of 60 rounds, time permitting. In the beginning of each round, the computer
will generate the project quality q and randomly determine 3 other investors who will be in your
group. Computer will also generate two signals for each participant. The ¯rst signal | zero | will
be the same among all participants. The second signal will be private. It means that you cannot
see the signals received by other investors, and they cannot see the second signal received by you.
Your task is to submit an amount that you would like to invest. After you and all other
members of your group enter their decisions, the computer will calculate and display your pro¯t in
that particular round. Your pro¯t will be determined based on how well you guessed the project's
quality and how well you guessed the average investment made by others. In the end of the study
we will take the pro¯t you made in a randomly chosen sequence of 10 rounds and will convert it
into cash payment.
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